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SHORTAGES OF SKILLED LABOUR POWER AND CAPITAL
RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA
by Charles Meth
The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, it
seeks to evaluate the claims of those who argue that skill
shortages are a significant force for change in South Africa.
Secondly, it attempts to develop a critical analysis of an
article by a Marxist writer, who somewhat surprisingly places
'skill shortages' well upstage in a recent article which
examined the restructuring of capital in South Africa. The
topic of skill shortages is a hardy perennial on the local
scene, the more so because the race question tends to obs-
cure the nature of class warfare here.
According to a host of commentators, eliminating the
colour bar will release a seriously binding constraint on
the 'economy' and open the way to a period of unparalleled
capital accumulation.
Statistics on skill shortages produced to support this
claim share one important characteristic and that is their
almost universal unreliability.
Given the conditions in this country, it is obvious that
whether or not tiiere really exists a skill shortage, a per-
sistent belief that there ,\ = such a-thingf oart^u.^rly £.--_.-_.
belief that such shortages are widespread, is likely ulti-
mately to have important political consequences.
Capital has long maintained that restrictive legislation
and practice make such shortages endemic, but more signifi-
cantly, the state has in recent times begun to voice similar
claims - timorously at first, but latterly with increasing
stridency. What is more, they are apparently prepared now
to back their words with action, as the generalised easing
of access to training, testifies.
The question is, why? is there really a skill shortage?1
Or is the phenomenon a convenient smokescreen behind which
co-optation of an incipient black petty bourgeoisie can pro-
ceed?
Clearly, it would be absurd to deny that serious speci-
fic skill shortages have occurred and doubtless will continue
to occur. Even the Soviet Union, with its massive planning
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capability, has difficulties in this regard. For example,
Kruschev told a conference in 1959 that:
"we do not have any scientifically reliable method
of estimating how many and what kind of specialists
we need in different branches of the national eco-
nomy, what the future demand will be for a certain
kind of specialist and when such a demand will
arise."2
If that is the situation in the Soviet Union, then
it must be the case, that permanent disequilibrium is
a fundamental characteristic of all except the most stag-
nant social formations and that where social labour is
allocated by the law of value an equivalence of the demand
for and supply of specific categories of labour power
is simply a freak occurrence. This is confirmed by
reports from the dominant capitalist social formations,
where, for example, shortages of skilled manual workers
are regularly reported.
The South African problem then is one of degree,
not of kind and more specifically is concerned with the
alleged impediments to the adjustment processes flowing
from the disequilibria discussed above. The question
thus remains, does the actual skill shortage merit the
massive attention, it receives?
This is exceedingly difficult to answer and can
only be approached circuitously - one could for example
enquire as to who would benefit from the blockage of
conventional adjustment mechanisms3 and the first and most
obvious answer is of course - organised labour, in parti-
cular, the members of craft unions. By maintaining
artificial scarcity, this group can extract monopoly
rentals. However, such a strategy involves the risk in
many cases of being outflanked - the old saw about no-one
being indispensable contains more than a grain of truth.
At any event, it is significant that craft unions often
vehemently deny the claim that skill shortages Q-lrt. „
The next group who stand to gain from a blockage
of the process by which supply and demand are brought
into something near equality, is the racist state - the
payoff being grateful voters. A great deal of ink has
been spilt over this topic - possibly the most interes-
ting question now in the state/white worker relationship .
is that concerning the reasons why the state is accused
of 'abandoning1 those workers whom it so assiduously
sought to protect in former times? Further comment on
this interesting turnabout will be held until later in
the article.
Capital, paradoxically, is the other group likely
to profit from a 'skill shortage', especially if, as is
suspected, many of the so-called shortages have been
either exaggerated or largely imaginary.
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There are several ways in which this may work, for
example, capital subscribes enthusiastically with organ-
ised labour to the myth of 'rising skills' and in this
way is able to ensure widespread application of the Babbage
principle. The process known as 'floating the colour bar1
is generally argued to be one in which whites are 'bought-
off' and blacks are brought in to perform fragmented or
diluted portions of the job previously performed by whites
- the obvious implication being that if sufficient skilled
workers had been available, this process would not have
occurred.
A moment's reflection suggests that this line of
reasoning is naive - capitalist technology has succeeded
in reducing many skilled occupations to a mere shell -
the difficulty often is to get rid of the refractory
'skilled' workers occupying such positions.4 Sweeteners,
in the form of generous redundancy payments or guaranteed
sinecures such as those which followed the introduction
of electronic editing into the newspaper industry, or
the availability to skilled manual workers of abundant
alternate employment e.g. as technical sales personnel,
help to drive away unwanted 'skilled workers' and help
to accomplish in the twinkling of an eye that which capi-
tal has had to struggle bitterly to achieve in other
countries.5
Another reason for actively fostering the ideology
of rising skills is the degree of control possible through
the maintenance of a strongly hierarchically structured
labour force. This ploy effectively neutralizes the ob-
vious political dangers which would result from workers
having a clearer perception of class identity.
Yet another aspect of bourgeois divide and rule tech-
nology made possible by a fostering of the notions of skill
shortages and rising demands for skills is the almost
universal advocacy of education as a panacea, a cure-all
for the woes of the working class.6
Although South Africa possibly does not yet suffer
to the same degree from the problem noted by Ivor Berg7
in the USA, namely that education 'hia? h^cc^:^ & Z'iz.z±Lx'Cy,- ~"
because work performance is in many instances inversely
related to educational achievement, the research results
of a number of workers suggest that lack of formal edu-
cation is NOT a significant barrier to job advancement,
even amongst Africans.8
It is fashionable nowadays to talk of upward mobility
of black and particularly of African workers, as a solu-
tion to the acute shortages the economy allegedly faces,
therefore, it is instructive to examine the details of
some of the training schemes to which these alleged shor-
tages give rise.
A 'new plan1, reportedly to train mature workers and
returning national servicemen was launched in 1979 by
SEIFSA, one of the largest employer organisations in the
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country. A leading SEIFA spokesman allegedly explained
that the scheme was designed to cater for skill shortages
in some trades which would be worsened by the expected
upturn in the industry and was quoted as saying that:
"we don't want to import immigrant labour and
we see this as a way of using SA resources to
the full."9
When it was suggested that this new scheme opened
a possible avenue for the training of Africans as artisans,
he is reported to have ruled this out, commenting that:
"trainees will have to have a certain educational
level which the vast majority of blacks don't
have."x °
According to the report, a pilot scheme for training
plater/boilermakers was mooted. Entry qualification for
this trade is a Std. VII school certificate. A study
on African unemployment conducted in 191111 showed 16.4
per cent of the urban male unemployed and 11,2 per cent
of the rural male unemployed had passed Std. VIII or higher,
whilst more than a further 40 per cent of each group had
7-9 years of schooling. The 'vast majority of blacks'
do not need to be 'educated'12 to fill a few vacancies in
the engineering industry and the fact that SIEFSA did not
know this casts serious doubts on their pronouncements
in areas where knowledge is less readily .obtainable,e.g.
on the magnitude of skill shortages.
More interesting perhaps is the snail-like progress
of blacks into apprenticeships since the Wiehahn reforms.
The numbers admitted so far, for whatever reason, are
trivial. Whether this is the result of white union resis-
tance on the apprenticeship committees as suggested by
various commentators is not known. Certainly one possibi-
lity which is very seldom aired is simple reluctance on
the part of capital in general to train. Of course, the
new generous allowances instituted as a further part of
the Wiehahn reforms may have the desirea effect, out ±c ' "•""
is remarkable that the costs of producing compound labour-
power had to be completely socialised before capital was
prepared to train artisans with any marked enthusiasm.
It is a great pity that this coincides with the lifting
of a race barrier as the separation out of the two effects
now becomes impossible and 'reform capital1 adds yet another
feather to its cap.
Thus, it may be seen that for capital, the benefits
of 'skill shortages' are manifold - in addition to the
strong likelihood of reduced costs, the maintenance of the
ideology of skills is essential to the continued repro-
duction of the class system - a task in which they are
ably if unwittingly, assisted by white workers.13
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As stated in the introduction, one purpose of this
article is to explore the validity of the skill shortage
argument. Two sources of such arguments namely capital
and the state, were identified and an attempt was made to
explain why the topic merited so much attention.
Because of the absence of hard data, most analyses
of skill shortages tend to be future-oriented in the
sense that they speculate about potential consequences
rather than attempt to analyse t'he past. The startling
contrast to this convention was the recent use by a
Marxist analyst, of skill shortages as an important
explanatory variable of the most recent economic crisis.
In contrast to the ad hoc nature of most comments
on skill shortage, the article referred to above, by
Robert Davies lt* attempted to locate the problem within
the contest of recent developments in the South African
social formation.
It is convenient to use the Davies article as a
platform from which to launch a critique on the ideology
of skill shortage and it must be said at the outset that
whereas his political and ideological analyses are both
perceptive and useful, his attempt to ground his analysis
of crisis firmly in the economic, contains many untested
and possibly untestable propositions which weaken his
argument.
Davies argues that in the face of shortages of
certain categories of labour power in the circulation
process in the boom periods of the sixties and early sev-
enties, production levels and hence the rate of capital
accumulation, were in part, maintained by the use of :
"larger than average amounts of money capital"
from the "abundance of foreign investment seeking,
a share in the profits of the super-exploitation
of black labour."15
These shortages are said to have produced a tendency
for capital to spend a longer than average time, unpro-
ductively employed in the circulation process.16 In the
then prevailing circumstances, 'gentle floating1 of the
colour bar was possible and the bourgeoisie had no need
to engage in serious class struggle to bring about a
restructuring of the racial division of labour.
Changed conditions in the mid-seventies, in parti-
cular diminished profitability and political unrest,
coupled with reduced flows of investment funds., in com-
bination with the increasing cost of floating the colour
bar, have, it is argued:
"produced the imperatives for capital to seek a modi
fication in the racial division of labour and the
removal of job colour bar legislation."17
Furthermore, this crisis of profitability cannot
be resolved by raising the rate of exploitation of the
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working class through the lowering of wages or by increa-
sing the length of the working day and, therefore capital,
he continues, is forced to restructure production at a
higher organic composition. This however:
"must necessarily involve the inescapable combina-
tion of further structural unemployment and the
further deski11ing and subordination of manual
labour on the one hand and the creation of an
increased number of specialist and mental places,
on the other."18
But instead of easing the problem, raising the organic
composition of capital will simply exacerbate the shortages
which were part of the cause of the crisis in the first
instance - unless capital can force a restructuring of
the racial division of labour. Thus, according to Davies,
capital has no alternative other than to engage in serious
class warfare.
Unfortunately, the evidence offered to support these
bold assertions is an equally bold and sweeping set of
generalizations culled from very partisan sources. For
example, in discussing the increasing costs of 'floating
the colour bar' in the mid-seventies, Davies quotes the
Vice-President of the Federated Chamber of Industries as
saying in 1976 that:
"present policy was forcing employers to pay
unrealistic and artificial premium wages
thereby increasing, instead of reducing costs."19
It would be strange if capital did not complain about
rising wage costs, however, the Census of Manufacturing,
1976 shows that between 1972 and 1976, labour costs as a
percentage of total costs fell in nineteen of twenty-seven
major groups (industries) in the manufacturing sector,
and in five of the industries in which labour costs rose,
the rate of net profit rose as well- In the manufacturing
sector, average salaries and wage's grcv.* tit th« raci ^Z - ' '
14,07 per cent per annum over the period, whereas net
output per employee grew at 15,26 per cent and net profit
at the rate of 26,63 per cent per annum. However, material
costs over the same period rose at the rate of 23,27 per
cent per annum so it is clear that capital was up to its
usual trick of applying pressure in the only place they
could i.e. on the workers. With inflation averaging 11.4
per cent per annum at the time, the modest gains made by
workers - 20 most of them from a pitifully low base -
give the lie to F.C.I, propaganda.
Public statements need to be treated with great cau-
tion, because very often what one is looking at is not an
analysis of objective conditions which.may lead to social
change, but rather some aspect or other of bourgeois ideo-
logy. Examination of the disjunction between the two is
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an important exercise. Marx himself was not immune to the
danger of accepting uncritically, the claims of various
capitalist "authorities1. In a recent article on the
capitalist labour process, Lazonick argues that Marx occa-
sionally underestimated the importance of the material con-
ditions of class struggle over innovation and concluded that:
"a useful theoretical framework will not yield useful
conclusions when it serves as a substitute for, rather
than a guide to, empirical analysis."21
With this important stricture in mind, and, bearing
in mind the twofold purpose of. this article i.e. to evaluate
conventional 'skill shortage' estimates and to develop a
critique of Davies' methodology, it is proposed to examine
his hypothesis, that in addition to shortages of technicians,
supervisors and artisans which affected the production pro-
cess, circulation has taken place at less than average eff-
iciency because of:
"shortages of clerical, administrative, sales and other
staff engaged in the unproductive but necessary task
of realizing surplus value."22
Apart from internal reports, usually unpublished,
compiled by worker and capitalist organisations, three
methods of discovering skill shortages are generally used
in South Africa. The first is the set of Manpower Surveys
published by the Department of Manpower Utilization (for-
merly Labour); the second is the method of international
comparison and, the third is the method of manpower supply
and demand projection.
Davies presents results from all three sources and
then states that:
"although all of these calculations do have defects,
they do at least indicate in a general way:
(a) that South African capitalism has been exper-
iencing a shortage of skilled labour power since
at least the mid-sixties;
(b) that these shortages have persisted despite the
current recession ....
(c) that given the continued reproduction of the racist
hierarchical division of labour in its present
form, they are likely to continue to persist into
the forseeable future."2 3
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He claims that figures given by the Minister of Labour
for April 1977 show:
"shortages of 99 000 (1,9 per cent) continuing to exist
in the professional, semi-professional and technical
grades despite the recession."211
This presumably refers to the Manpower Survey No. 12,
All Industries and Occupations,29 April 197? published by
the Department of Labour, which shows that there were 99 260
vacancies in a total workforce (agricultural and domestic
workers excluded) of 5 289 415. However, of these 99 260 va-
cancies, only 18 126 were in the occupational group 'Profes-
sional, Semi-Professional and Technical', and of these 18 126
vacancies, 9 858 were for medical doctors, nurses, trainee
nurses and teachers.
Total shortage figures for each occupation are not very
useful - of far greater significance are the occupational
structures and patterns of vacancies for the economy, by
sector groups or departments. Table 1 gives this information
for workers of all races in occupational categories, 01 to
04, i.e. Professional, Semi-Professional and Technical;
Managerial, Executive and Administrative; Clerical; Sales
and Related.
There is no yardstick by which to gauge the seriousness
of a particular labour shortage, one is thus reduced to
expressing opinions. With one or two exceptions, the shor-
tage or 'vacancies' reflected in Table 1 do not appear to be
serious. In most cases, they are low in percentage (and in
absolute) terms. What is more, the pattern of vacancies
conforms to the different levels of activity in the different
branches of the economy at the time, for not all sectors of
the economy were equally depressed. •
Shortages of varying degrees of seriousness were repor-
ted in most of the public services and in the Basic Metal
industry, which is dominated by Iscor25, a public (state)
corporation. Whether these shortages were real or simply
the reflection of divergence from some 'notional establish-
ment level' is not known, the latter, seems more xixeiy.
Mining was expanding rapidly, hence the vacancies for pro-
fessional semi-professional and technical workers.26
A similar exercise, carried out for artisans also
suggests that the much vaunted shortage which has "persisted
despite the current recession" was in all probability,
notional only. In fact, the reported shortages of building
workers in the Wiehahn report which quoted the same sources
as above, coincided with massive unemployment, far out-
weighing reported vacancies - exactly what one would expect
during a crisis!2 7
For conventional researchers these results are awkward,
but for Davies they are doubly so, because his project is
much more ambitious - recall that he needs to demonstrate,
the existence of a shortage of unproductive workers in the
sphere or circulation. Use of official sources referred
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to previously rather than newspaper reports, would have
permitted Davies to discount his claims by the percentage
of doctors, nurses, teachers and others present. Such a
procedure is also likely to have compelled him to identify
the spheres of production and circulation far more rigo-
rously and in particular, he would have had to look closely
at the distinction between productive and unproductive
labour. The difficulties involved in this exercise are
considerable. Not only of course, are there productive and
unproductive spheres of the economy (productive or unproduc-
tive of value and surplus value that is), but there are also
productive and unproductive workers within the productive
sphere. (see Appendix)
Even if it were shown that there were shortages of
workers in the International Standard Classification of
Occupations, 0, 1, 2 and 3 (Manpower Survey Occupational
Groups 01, 02, 03 and 04) 2 8 given the quality of the exis-
ting data, it cannot be shown that the shortages were located
in the realm of circulation. Furthermore, where shortages
are known to exist in this realm, they cannot in general be
shown to be serious.
Given the paucity of published data on the distribu-
tion of vacancies prior to 1977, it is impossible to say,
with any precision, which sectors of the South African
economy have been plagued by shortages of 'clerical, admini-
strative, sales and other staff. It is thus not possible,
at least in the case of the clerical and administrative
workers, to show that significant shortages of 'unproduc-
tive' workers have existed.
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
A popular way, especially with bourgeois analysts,
of attemtping to demonstrate the existence of shortages
of skilled labour-power as a constraint on accumulation, is
the method of international comparison of occupational
structures. No amount of dodging behind academic caveats
can obscure the likelihood that comparisons at high levels
of aggregation are for the most part simply misleading.
Essentially, Davies1 approach is to suggest that the
distribution of occupations in the different capitalist
countries tends to norms which are in some way related
to their state of development. Thus, he argues that South
Africa was:
"roughly on a par with the norms established in
international capitalist competition for the so-called
middle level industrialised countries."29
and that a drift of 1,5 per cent from a norm of 18 - 20
per cent (note that the 'drift' is smaller than the range
of values) of the economically active population in occu-
pational groups 01 - 04, over a period of 10 years or so,
is evidence of shortage of these workers.
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There are several problems here. Firstly, there is the
problem discussed above, which results from attempting to
apply bourgeois statistics to the Marxism categories of
productive and unproductive labour. Because of the 'coarse-
ness' which results from the aggregation of international
labour statistics, it is impossible to say. anything meaning-
ful about the distribution of workers in the different
spheres of the various economies.
More important that this though, is the totally unwarr-
anted use of the assumption that 'international capitalist
competition1 is capable of altering basic structural char-
acteristics of highly differentiated social formations
in some short space of time. Even developed capitalist
economies exhibit striking differences in occupational
structures. If one mixes in the odd colony or so, the
international comparisons that can be constructed are highly
instructive. Consider Table 2. Was Japan seriously short
of Professional, Semi-Professional and Technical workers
in 1970? By comparison with Denmark it would certainly
appear so. Did Denmark have an acute shortage of Managers,
Administrators and Executives in 197O? By comparison with
Japan it seems as though they did - by comparison with
Puerto Rico it seems almost impossible that they did not!
This sort of analysis is clearly unsound.
In any event, instead of comparing South Africa with
Western Europe and North America, as is sometimes done,
he suggests that comparison with the so-called middle-level
industrialized countries referred to earlier might be "more
valid."30
He may well be correct, but his choice of countries
to make the point is somewhat unfortunate. Differences in
structural variables between them assume an importance
which cannot be ignored. Tables 3 and 4 give values for
some of these variables, for two of the countries selected
by Davies.
With such large differences in .the relative sizes
of the different branches of economic activity, within and
between which occupational distributions are likely to
differ significantly and with such different GNP's, popula-
tion growth rates and such vastly different per capita
incomes, it is difficult to see why it should be thought
that there is any tendency to some norm or other.
Mining in South Africa offers an object lesson in this .
regard. The industry employes nearly 15 times more workers
than does the same activity in Argentina and 38 times more
than in Egypt.31
Of the 656 287 workers employed in mining in South Afr-
ica in 1977, a mere 34 546 or 5,3 per cent32 were employed
in occupational categories 01 - 04. South African coal-
mines had a workforce of 91 535 in 1977, of whom only 2 333
were in categories 01 - 04. 3 3 Yet, South African coalminers
produce more than twice as much coal per man shift under-'
ground than do the West German miners.31* If large sectors
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of the South African economy look like this, what happens
to the 'international norms'? They should be consigned
to the scrapheap, along with several other propositions
which have been invalidated by the passing on of perfect
compet it ion.
MANPOWER PROJECTION
Manpower projections are good clean fun and relatively
harmless, as long as they are not taken too seriously.
Apart from anything else, the data bases upon which such
estimates are made often contain inconsistencies. Even
when good data is available and sophisticated techniques
are used, success is by no means assured. The literature
is replete with wildly inaccurate forecasts.35
Davies hoped to show or at least to suggest, that
capital believes that unless the 'racist hierarchial divi-
sion of labour'is changed, shortages of certain categories
of skilled labour power will "persist into the foreseeable
future."36 To achieve this, he used, amongst other things,
a calculation made by Parsons of the Chamber of Mines,
which has:
"referred to a demand for 2 796 000 white colour
(presumably collar?) employees by 1990 assuming
a 5 per cent rate of growth. Comparing this with
an estimated 1 348 000 whites available to fill these
places, this indicates a shortage of 1 448 000 un-
filled white collar places unless they are turned
over to persons of other races."37
Once again, because Davies has apparently relied on second-
hand material, the picture he presents is somewhat mis-
leading. Parsons' estimate3 8 actually looks like this:
For the year 1990
Projected economically active population 13 910 000
Projected proportion of population in
groups 01-04 20,1%
Projected number of workers in groups
01-04 . 2 796 000
Demand for whites, assuming they continue
to make up 67,3% of this group 1 882 000
Supply of whites, assuming that whites
in this group continue to comprise
57,8% of the white economically active
population 1 348 000
SHORTAGE 534 000
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The predicted shortage depends crucially on the two
assumptions in italics above. Are the assumptions rea-
sonable? Parsons justifies the first assumption on the
following grounds. He says that:
"If Whites continued to comprise 67,3 per cent of
this occupational category as they did in 1970,
this already implies an expansion in the number of
qualified non-whites to fill the remaining one-third
of this rapidly expanding group."39
The second assumption is justified on the grounds that
the 57,8 per cent of economically active whites in 'white
collar' jobs is already much greater than the 48,3 per cent
of Americans in similar occupations in 1970 - thus it is
concluded that further increases in the percentage of whites
in these categories would seriously affect the 'quality1
of white-collar workers.
"The majority of 'white-collar1 jobs, the highest
skill category" according to Parsons "would therefore
need to be filled by non-whites."1*0
If education is used as a surrogate for 'quality',
then this putative limit, once again suggesting a 'norm'
to which social formations gravitate, appears dubious, to
say the least. In Table 5 are shown the educational profiles
for whites in 1970.
Of the workers in occupational categories 01 - 04,
fourteen percent were people with Standard 7 or less and a
further 30,2 per cent had only Standard 8 or 9. Are they
among the "highest skill category" of workers? According
to the population census in 1970, there were 1 295 28841
white-collar workers in the South African economy. The
median educational level of the black 'white-collar'
workers was much lower than that of the whites.42 In view
of this,it does seem questionable at least, to argue that
the proportion of whites in white-collar occupations
could not rise without lowering quality.
In 1970, there were 159 084 white women educated to
Standard 10, 42 046 with Standard 10 plus diploma and
14 702 with degrees, who were not economically active.
Given different circumstances, their partxcipation rates
could43 and did44 rise. Also, white employment in the
occupational category 'production workers', decreased absol-
utely between 1969 and 1977.*5 Of these workers classified
by the 1970 Census as production workers, at least 200 000
appear to be eligible by educational qualification, if not
by disposition, to perform 'white-collar' tasks.
If one drops Parsons' assumed proportions and replaces
them with figures which appear to accord with observed ex-
perience over the years 1969 to 1977, then the projected
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shortage of whites in occupational categories 01 - O4
turns into a surplus. This conclusion is strengthened
by the estimate of a white unemployment rate as high as
4.0 per cent in 1987, made in the latest Economic Develop-
ment Programme, 46 even on the assumption of a sustained
growth rate of 4,5 per cent per annum and, it is further
questioned by the Human Sciences Research Council predic-
tion of an excess supply of persons educated to Standard 8,
9 or 10 of nearly 200 000 by this year (1981).* 7
On the basis of the foregoing analyses, it is submit-
ted that the 'defects' in the calculations to which Davies
refers, are so serious as to prevent his being able to
establish, even in a 'general way', that the specific shor-
tages of labour-power in which he is interested, have
existed or may exist. His argument is thus left hanging in
mid-air.
Digressing for a while from the question of skill
shortages, there are several other issues raised by his
article which call for comment. For instance, it was
noted above that Davies claimed that:
"the crisis of profitability has forced the capitalist
class in South Africa to attempt to restructure
capitalist production at a higher organic composi-
tion of capital."48
This, it was argued, took place because the other
methods of increasing exploitation were not possible.
It is common cause that 'capital intensity1, some-
times interpreted as the aggregate capital/labour ratio
in the South African economy, has risen in recent years,
and concern is frequently expressed at this development.
Presumably, the only surrogate source of information
on the organic composition of capital open to Davies, is
that available to everyone else, namely aggregate capital/
labour ratios. These ratios are more interesting for what
they conceal than what they reveal. However, it is possible
to use the existing data, its shortcomings notwithstanding,
to cast a little light on the matter.
Table 6 shows changes in the current(rand) value of
plant, machinery and equipment per man in selected mining
and manufacturing activities, the most likely sites of
struggle for control over the labour process.
Problems of capital valuation 49 are too well known
to be discussed here - mention will simply be made of the
extreme sensitivity of capital values to assumptions about
depreciation, the difficulties associated with inflation
and the difficulty of estimating the value of rented equip-
ment .
Over the period in question, the price of plant,
machinery and equipment, much of which is imported, probably
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grew at the rate of about 8 or 9 per cent per annum, the
most rapid growth taking place in the latter half of the
period. Ignoring the problem of the different vintages
of capital goods, this figure approaches the average growth
rate for capital/man in both Mining and Manufacturing. Of
more interest, though, are the patterns of structural
change within these two major divisions.
In Manufacturing, Basic Metals and Chemicals, whilst
providing only 12,2 per cent of employment at the beginning
of the period, used 26,9 per cent of all plant, machinery
and equipment.
By 1976, these two industries provided 14,6 per cent
of employment, but used 47,9 per cent of the plant in
existence. This is obviously accounted for by the activi-
ties of Iscor, Sasol and the large investments by the
private sector in steel and chemicals* Whether this splurge
of investment can be attributed to the impossibility of
using:
"Alternative methods of increasing the exploitation
of the working class - such as increasing the
length of the working day, increasing the intensity
of labour, or reducing the absolute level of
wages " 5 °
as a means of raising profitability is much to be doubted.
Rates of growth of K/L ratios in the other industries do
not appear to suggest that capital intensity is growing
at an alarming rate.
The picture is somewhat different in Mining, where
employment fell over the period and capital intensity,
as measured by the capital/labour ratio appears to have
risen substantially in coal and 'other1 mining.
It may well be the case that class struggle has forced
the coal mine owners to restructure capital at a higher
organic composition. Certainly, wage costs per ton of coal
produced have risen sharply 5 1 - however, it appears that
mechanisation has led to a more than proportionate increase
in gross surplus. 5 2 At the new higher wage levels, massive
investment programmes have been undertaken, mainly to supply
the rapidly growing demands of the major consumer of coal,
Escom 5 3, the electricity generating authority, and to sell
on world markets.
'Other mining' is dominated by Iron, Chrome, Copper,
Manganese and Vanadium. Output has in general doubled or
trebled and in the case of Vanadium, increased sixfold in
the period from 1966 to 1976. 5 4 Many of the mines involved
are entirely new ventures - in these days of rapidly rising
producer good prices it is not surprising that capital/
labour ratios are reported to be rising.
Readers do not need to be reminded that rising capital/
labour ratios are not the same as a rising organic composi-
tion of capital. There is, to the author's knowledge, no
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study in value terms, which shows that the organic composi-
tion of capital has risen in recent years. Even if it has,
it is by no means sure what the consequences for the rate
of profit would be. Given that there exist significant
monopoly elements within the South African economy and, in
many cases, strong barriers against international competi-
tion, coupled with active state intervention in price
determination, it is at least conceivable that price and
value could diverge and what is more, stay that way for
long periods. Detailed studies of crisis and of price/
value relations are an absolute essential before confident
generalisations about 'restructuring at a higher level of
organic composition1 can be made.
A corollary of the rising organic composition of capital
is claimed to be:
"further structural unemployment and the further
deskilling and subordination of manual labour ....n55
The first half of the latter statement might well be
true but the second implies so crude and mechanistic a view
of the labour process, that it hardly merits attention.
Where, one might ask in passing, are the studies which show
that the mass of manual workers in South Africa has become
deskilled as accumulation has proceeded? As Elger points
out:
"it is necessary to advance beyond ... the spurious
concreteness of the generic impulse towards
deskilling ... "56
To ignore.the potential for enhanced worker power
amongst 'new' workers, who presumably enter the market for
labour-power without any industrial skills whatever, to
ignore the possible gains in strength of the new collective
workers, it is to ignore the ever-present contradictions
of capital and to assert that real domination can be achie-
ved by restructuring the labour process. There is a strong
tension between this observation on 'further subordination1,
and Davies1 quite correct observations earlier on that the
level of class struggle in the workplace is rising.
Yet another area in which traces of mechanistic thinking
is evidenced is in the relationship between demographic
trends and labour-power requirements for the reproduction
of capital. Davies claims that:
"in the period since the mid-sixties at least, the
extended reproduction of monopoly capitalist rela-
tions has proceeded at a rate in excess of the rate
of growth of the white population;"57
This circumstance, in conjunction with other factors,
it is argued, had led to shortages of certain categories
of workers.
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What this statement actually does is to take a perfectly
comprehensible occurrence, i.e. the fact that the demand
for workers in positions 'normally.' occupied by Whites in
the South African social formation as a whole, has grown
faster than the supply, and succeeded in rendering it totally
obscure.
There is no a priori reason why the extended reproduc-
tion of monopoly capitalist relations of production should
bear any, but the most tenuous relationship with the rate of
growth of the white population. Changing participation rates
alone are enough to break the link.
The concept of monopoly capital is fairly elastic and
whilst it is likely that concentration and centralization
have proceeded apace, this process coincides with vast
expansion of competitive capital. It is by no means impossi-
ble that the centralization of capital may produce economies
of scale in the use of skilled labour-power.and that this
process could balance out the growing demand due to rapid
accumulation. Small businesses probably do not enjoy econo-
mies of scale in the use of white-collar workers and thus
are likely to require proportionately more of these workers.
To the extent that small businesses mushroomed during the
period58 the relationship between the reproduction of mono-
poly capitalist relations and the rate of growth of the white
population becomes even more tenuous.
Finally, a comment on the Davies attempt to relate
changes in occupational structures to foreign capital move-
ments .
He claims that the imperative for restructuring the
racial divison of labour emerged after the 1976/77 flight
of capital from South Africa. To demonstrate this, he
quotes total long term foreign investments, total net
capital inflows and short-term private sector capital
movements for the years 1974/75 to 1976/77, which show a_ .
substantial reduction in the two former categories and an
outflow in the latter and he concludes that:
"the mitigating effects in respect of the shortages of
labour power in the circulation process previously
provided by the large amounts of foreign investment
capital could no longer apply11.59
Whilst it is true that foreign capital inflows dimi-
nished markedly, it is far from clear what the implications
are of this for the 'mitigating effects' thesis. It seems
unlikely that anything less than a -detailed examination of
these flows, particularly of private capital movements, will
serve to establish his hypothesis.
In any event, the upper turning point of the business
cycle was located in the third quarter of 197460, whilst
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relatively large inflows of capital continued through
1975/76. Also, long term non-direct private foreign lia-
bilities continued to increase through to 1977. 61 By the
time the decrease in private investment funds became noti-
ceable, the shortages of labour-power which they are ar-
gued to have been mitigating, probably did not exist.62
Balance-of-payments data is notoriously difficult to inter-
pret, possibly more so in a period when the relative magni-
tudes of the different components of the external accounts
are changing rapidly.63 Consider for example, this statement:
A substantial net outflow of capital of R872 million
occurred during the third quarter, bringing the total
net outflow during the first nine months of 1979 to
R2 229 million.s *
Viewed in isolation, this sounds quite alarming. Closer
examination, however, reveals that it (the outflow) was rela-
ted to the repayment of short-term foreign loans. Foreign
interest rates had risen and the margin between the effec-
tive cost of trade financing had widened, hence the repay-
ments. The point to be noted here is that the bare figures
for any one or even possibly a few years, can be misleading.
If one restricts one's view to private sector trans-
actions, then it could be argued that the significant var-
iables for the mitigation thesis are either net changes in
foreign liabilities or total net private capital movements
and the proportion of net domestic fixed investment which
these represent.
Long term.direct investments (net change in private
liabilities) over the period 1963 to 1976 show a slow up-
ward trend, which when' deflated becomes a very slow upward
trend. Non-direct investment, apart from one large leap
in 1975, does likewise. Stock exchange transactions are
interesting bat do not appear to be highly significant in a
quantitative sense. Changes in short-term capital movements
are closely related to changes in the level of merchandise
imports and, therefore, far less clearly related to the issue
of •mitigation1. The net increase in private foreign lia-
bilities over assets during the period was R2 375 million,
whilst net domestic fixed investment by private businesses
amounted to R15 851 million. The percentage of investment
accounted for by increases in foreign liabilities each year
was extremely erratic - the changes show a slight upward
trend but the variations increase in intensity. The hypoth-
esis that capital relied on 'abundant' infusions of foreign
investment to mitigate shortages, does not obtain much
support from these figures.65
The really important change which took place in the
structure of South Africa's foreign liabilities is not
referred to at all by Davies - this change was the increa-
sing reliance, through the seventies, on overseas
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borrowing as a means of financing public sector expenditure.
Central Government and Banking Sector liabilities increa-
sed by more than R2 000 million over the period 1970 to
1976, whilst Public Corporation and Local Authorities in-
creased their indebtedness by more than R2 700 million.66
The reasons for this development relate mainly to the rapid
growth of this sector and its declining ability to self-
finance its consumption and investment expenditure- Persis-
tent deficits in the balance-of-payments, in which the im-
portation of producer goods for the highly capital inten-
sive public sector industries appears to have played an
important role, were financed by foreign borrowing.67
Thus, before the recent rises in the gold price, fears of
a drying-up of overseas loans leading to competition bet-
ween the public and private sectors, for scarce funds,
were probably quite real. In addition to this, it has been
shown that in spite of a reluctance on government's part
to further burden the private sector, the tax pressure on
private business increased significantly during the period
1970-77,58 thus diminishing this sector's ability to finance
its own investment. These factors, coupled with increasing
capital intensity in both the public sector and in certain
parts of the private sector, which increases still further,
the need to borrow, are what lay behind the alarm at the
prospect of overseas funds no longer being available on
reasonable terms.
These complex processes cannot be boiled down to a
few simplistic assertions about mitigation. It is clear
that to sustain any claims about abundant inflows permit-'
ting inefficient circulation, would require careful and
precise analysis of these flows.
Comment has already been made on the question of increa-
sing capital intensity - the other obvious factor requiring
explanation is the growing public sector involvo~sr.t,. G 9
Although the rapid rate of growth of public sector emplov-
ment in the past is clearly relevant to the issue of
'shortages' of workers in occupational categories 01 to 037° ,
an explanation of this tendency will not be attempted here.
What precisely are the relations between the state and the
sphere of commodity circulation? What if the shortages of
unproductive workers (if it existed) was confined to the
state? These are questions which must at some stage
be addressed.
One may remark in passing that a very considerable
impetus to changing the present allocation of economic
activity stems, as a component of the "total strategy",
from the state itself.The.-phenomenon is widely reported
and the corresponding clamour from 'private enterprise1
for government to disengage still further, shows no sign
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of abating. In view of the perceived change in the atti-
tude of the state towards certain sections of the white
work-force, notably the miners, it seems at least possible
that capital only now considers class warfare worth their
while.
It is surely more than mere coincidence that capital's
new assertiveness appeared precisely at the time when the
state adopted a strongly 'pro-free enterprise' stance -
a stance which appears to be at one with international
capital's 'monetarist1 posturing, as an attempted solution
to the continuing crisis?
In any event, because of the new alliance between
the state and capital, capital may believe that the objec-
tive conditions of class struggle have altered in their
favour. As was suggested earlier, it is difficult to avoid
the suspicion that 'skill shortages' form part of a con-
venient smoke screen from behind the cover of which they
can push for the creation of the black petty bourgeoisie,
that both they and the state urgently require. A task
of the first order of importance therefore is to separate
out the rhetoric from the reality of capitalist practise
as far as 'training' is concerned. Despite their much
vaunted concern in this area under the banner of 'black
advancement1, the real changes are minimal thus far and
a possible explanation for this is precisely that capital
constantly exaggerates the extent of its demand for skilled
labour/power.
CONCLUSION
There is the distinct danger inherent in the approach
adopted in this article i.e. the requirement of rigorous
demonstration of the validity of each-assertion, that it
may demand of the progressive researcher, as Stedman Jones
puts it:
(that he waste) "too much time attempting to convert
heuristic concepts into the type of intellectual
statements that would be permissible within a liberal
positivist framework"71
If the received theory were settled beyond dispute, the
arguments offered above would be merely querulous. However,
it is not true for example that the rising organic composit-
ion of capital/falling rate of profit - crisis theorists
hold undisputed sway75 nor have Braverman or the Brighton
Labour Process Group spoken the last word on the CLP (both
saw their studies as a beginning!)
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Therefore, one feels justified in calling for the
evidence. Whilst it cannot be denied that specific
shortages of skilled labour-power have acted as serious
constraints on accumulation and will doubtless continue
to do so both here and in the dominant capitalist social
formations, it is probably also true to say that these same
shortages can be highly functional to both the state and
capital. On the one hand, they encourage the active
fostering of the myth of upward mobility, whilst permitting
'rationalisation1 of the labour process on the other.
Failure to use critically the insights flowing from
the intense and lively debates on the theoretical issues
raised by Davies' article, no less than failure to make
the best use of existing data, bourgeois or not, can
only lead to faulty analysis of these trends.
-oooOooo-
Table 1 Employment (N) and Percentage Vacancies (V/N%) by Sector of Employment,
Occupational Groups 01-04, April, 1977














































































































































































Sources: Manpower Survey No.12. 29 April 1977 Sector Groups, and Manpower Survey No.12. 29 April 1977T All
Industries and Occupations, both published by Department of Labour, Pretoria.
Note: Vacancies in the latter survey represent raised totals for each occupation, whereas in the former,
actual sample values are given. Samples in Mining and in the Public Sector are reported to be
close to 100%. The remaining shortages in the other sectors have been raised on the assumption
that they are evenly distributed. A Department of Manpower Utilisation (formerly Labour) spokes-
man confirmed that this would not produce significant errors.
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 Percentage of Economically Active PomilaHnn i n












































Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years.
International Labour Office, Geneva.
Table 3 Structure of Economically Active Population
1. Agriculture



























Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 1977. International Labour
Office, Geneva.
Note: Figures in Rows 1, 2 and 3 represent percentages of economically
active population in the particular activities.
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Table 4 Selected Economic Development Indicators - Average
Annual Real Growth Rates (%) 1965 - 1973 and
Per Capita GNP, 1970
Population Growth Rate
GDP Growth Rate













Source: World Tables 1976, for the World Bank, by John Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore and London, 1976

























































Source: Population Census 1970 - Occupations, Report No. 02-05-11.
Table A.3, Department of Statistics.
Table 6 Changes in the R Value of Machinery per Man in the Manufacturing
Sector (Selected Industrie-;). 1965/66 - 1976 and in Mining 1966 - 1975,
^~^-^-^_^ Industry
/ear, ^ ^ ~ ^ ^


















































































































































































Census of Manufacturing* 1965/63 Report No. 10-21~lSt 1970 Report No. 10-21-26 and 1976 Report No. 10-21-32 and
South African Statistics, 19?8> Department of S ta t i s t i c s .
P l an t , Machinery and Equipment.K = Value in current Rands
L ° Paid Employment.
ZK » Percentage of t o t a l stoirk of P l an t , Machinery and Equipment in p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s .
ZL = Percentage of t o t a l labour force employed in p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s .
AK/L% • Compound annual r a t e of growth of R value of P l an t . Machinery and Equipment per man.**
X Compound annual r a t e of growth of employment.** -
* Excluding Diamond Mines.
** Both over the period 1965/66 to 1975/76.
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fM Table 7. Net Capi ta l Movements and Net Domestic Fixed Investment (R M i l l i o n s )
Private Capital Movements
Net Changes in








Total Net Change in
Foreign L i a b i l i t i e s










Local Authori t ies
Net Domestic Fixed
Investments


















































































































































































































































Shortages of Skilled Labour 26
NOTES
1. See for example I.D. White, The changing labour process
and its consequences, a case study of a general engin-
eering firm in Natal, and C.E. Meth, Are there skill
shortages in the furniture industry? both in South
African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 4 , No. 7, November 1978
2. Quoted in Mark Blaug, An Introduction to the Economics
of Education, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976, p. 159
3. Barry Thomas and David Deaton, Labour Shortage and
Economic Analysis, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, p.17
ff.
4. In certain motor car manufacturing plants in the United
Kingdom, spot welding machine operators, an occupation
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are classified as skilled workers. This reflects the
strength of organised labour (Private communication
with U.K. shop steward group, 1979). In the 1978
SEIFSA Main Agreement, Spot welding is a Rate G occu-
pation, i.e. 63c/hr. The skilled workers rate (Rate A)
was R2,18/hr. (Government Notice R.1112 of 2 June 1978).
5. See Meth, op. cit.
6. See Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital. The
Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. Monthly
Review Press, New York and London, 1974, pp 442 and 443.
7. Quoted in ibid, p. 441
8. Jill Nattrass, Job Advancement : Difficulties in the
South African Context, Paper presented at HSRC Confer-
ence, September, 1979. A recent study of the Peterbor-
ough Manual workforce which excluded only craftsmen found
that "most jobs differ in this respect only that they
involve different levels of debasement". From this
it followed that most workers were objectively capable
of acquiring the necessary skills. They estimate that
85 per cent of the workers could do 95 per cent of the
jobs. See The Working Class in the Labour Market,
R.M. Blackburn and Michael Mann, MacMillan, London,
1979, p. 280
9. Financial Mail, May 18, 1979, p. 578
10. ibid.
11. Lieb J. Loots, A profile of black unemploymnet in
South Africa : two area surveys, SALDRU. Working Paper
No. 19, April 1978, Table 19, p. 21. These results
are not claimed to be representative, but they do raise
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serious doubts about the validity of many current
truisms relating to the unemployed.
12. See Pie vraag na en aanbod van mannekrag in die RSA in
1981 : Deel II, HSRC Report No. MM. 73, Pretoria
1978, p. 74 ff. Two processes, i.e. replacement of
lower educated workers by those with higher qualifica-
tions because of excess supply of educated labour-
power and squeezing of those with some education into
labourers occupations requiring no education because
of a projected shortage of these workers, are both
likely to occur, according to the HSRC.
13. In an article which could be misinterpreted as a
defence of racism, Jones argues that, "unrestricted
by State shackles, job Africanization of equal pro-
ductivity jobs is the inevitable result of the actions
of black workers, employers and white workers, all
acting independently in what they perceive to be their
own best interests". Due to 'economic effects1 beyond
the control of 'leading group members' black advancement
depresses wages, a most happy prospect for capital.
See Robert A. Jones, Is Black Advancement a Threat to
White Employment Security?", in Job Advancement in
South Africa, South Africa Foundation, 1980.
14. Robert Davies, Capital Restructuring and the Modifi-
cation of the Racial Division of Labour in South Africa,
Journal of Southern African Studies', Vol. 5, No. 2 April
1979.
15. Davies, op. <?£i.,pp. 186 and 187
16. Although it may not be possible to demonstrate the
existence of shortages of 'unproductive' workers, it
may well be possible to show that circulation has pro-
ceeded with less.than 'average efficiency1 by consulting
the ratios of different financial indicators culled
from company annual reports. These ratios, published
by Pretoria University cover a considerable period and
should be comparable with similar statistics from other
capitalist countries. The task of analysis though
is no mean job. This is one of the relatively rare
propositions in Marxian economic analysis where 'hard
data1 is available.
17. Davies, op cit., p. 188
18. ibid, p. 189
19. ibid, p. 188
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20. Census of Manufacturing 1976, Report No. 10-21-32,
Department of Statistics p. vii. Inflation Rate esti-
mated from Section on prices in S.A. Statistics l98Ot
Department of Satistics.
21. W. Lazonick, Industrial Relations and Technical Change
the case of the self-acting mule, Cambridge Journal
of Economics, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 1979, p. 258.
22. Davies, op. cit.y p. 183
23. ibid. p. 184
24.' ibid, p. 183
25. Iscor undertakes a disproportionate amount of training
in the SEIFSA group, of which it is a member. See C. E.
Meth, Trade Unions, Skill Shortages and Private Enter-
prise, South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 3,
October, 1979, p. 75 ff. and Financial Mail, April
11, 1980 p. 155.
26. See for example Standard Bank Review, July 1979, p. 3
27. See Meth (1979) op. cit.3 p. 78. It is interesting to
note that with much better information at his disposal,
Wiehahn also misinterprets and thus exaggerates the
seriousness of the skill shortage.
28. Manpower Survey No. 12, April 1977, All Industries
and Occupations, Department of Labour, Pretoria, p. 7
and Davies, op. cit., p. 183
29. Davies, op. cit.s p 183
30. ibid.
31. See Table 1 in this article and ILO Yearbooks of
Labour Statistics.
32. See Table 1.
33. Manpower Survey No. 12, 29 April 1977, Sector Groups,
Department of Labour, Pretoria.
34. Arnt Spandau, Mechanisation and Labour Policies on
South African Mines, Paper presented at the Biennial
Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa,
Zape Town, 19 79.
35. See for example, Paul T. Christy and Karen J. Horowitz,
an Evaluation of BLS projections of 1975 production
and employment, Monthly Labor Review. August, 1979,.p.8
"The absolute difference between actual and projected
employment for each of the 71 industries studied aver-
aged 81 099 jobs, or 8,0 per cent of total employment
for these industries."
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36. Davies, op. cit., p.184
37. ibid.
38. J.A. Parsons andN.L. Robertson, The Existing and
Future Resources of the Itepublic of South Africa : Will
these be Sufficient to Meet the Needs of Expanding
Populations? Unpublished paper, Human Resources Labo-
ratory, Chamber of Mines.
39. ibid, p. 16
40. ibid.
41. Population Census 1970 - Occupations, Report No, 02-
05-11, Department of Statistics.
42. The Demand for and Supply of Manpower Part Z, Human
Sciences Research Council, Report No. MM. 70, Pretoria
1977. See Tables 29 to 36. Davies refers in his arti-
cle to this report, but not to its sequel, Part II,
Report No. MM 73 of 1978 (mainly in Afrikaans ) which
deals extensively with projected shortages.
43. Female participation rates in some Eastern European
countries for example approach those of males. See 1L0
Yearbooks of Labour Statistics.
44. According to Human Sciences Research Council Report
So. MM. 73, op. cit.,pp. 70-74, "The average partici-
pation rate for White women increased from 29 per cent
in 1960 to 36 per cent in 1970, and an average figure
of 42 per cent is estimated for 1981."
45. Estimated from Manpower Surveys Nos. 6 to 12
46. Economic Development Programme for the Republic of
South Africa 1978-198?, Volume I. Office of the Econo-
mic Advisor to the Prime Minister, Pretoria, 1979, p-123
47. Human Sciences Research Council Report No. MM 73, op.
cit.t Tables 6.2 (a) to 6.5
48. Davies, op. cit.t p 189
49. Value is obviously used here in the bourgeois sense,
i.e. price.
50. Davies, op. cit., p. 189
5 1 . Wages p e r t o n m i n e d i n 1 9 6 6 = RO,54 and i n 1 9 7 5 = R l , 3 4 .
E s t i m a t e d from d a t a i n South African Statistics I978y
Department of S t a t i s t i c s P r e t o r i a , pp . 1 1 . 3 and 1 1 . 8
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52. Apparent gross surplus per ton mined in 1966 = RO,62
and in 1975 = R2,O3. Estimated from same source as
above.
53. Escom consumed 36 per cent of total coal production
in 1966 and 49 per cent in 1975. See Electricity-
Supply Commission, Annual Report 1976.
54. See South African Statistics 1978, op. cit.,
p. 11.6.
55. Davies, op. cit.t p. 189
56. Tony Elger, Valorisation and lDeskillingI : A Critique
of Braverman, Capital and Class, ^o. 7, Spring 1979,
p. 88.
57. Davies, op. cit. p. 182
58. At least 4000 manufacturing establishments, 7 500
construction establishments and 16 000 retail esta-
blishments came into existence in the period 1960-3
to 1972-6. Source: South African Statistics 1978
and Census of Manufacturing 1976, op. cit.
59. Davies, op. cit., p. 189
60. Annual Economic Report 1975, South African Feserve
Bank, p. 5.
61. See Table 7 following the Appendix to this article.
62. See Table 1 in this article.
63. Economic Development Programme, op. cit., pp. 88 and
89
64. South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin,
December 1979, pp. 12 & 13.
65. Sources of statistical information for Table 7 are
as follows: A statistical presentation of South
Africa's quarterly national accounts for the period
I960 to 1974. Supplement to South African Reserve
Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, March 1976. South African
Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, September 1979.
South Africa's balance of payments, 1956-1975 supple-
ment to South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin,
March 1977.
66. See Table 7.
67. Economic Development Programme, op. cit., pp 14, 84
and 88
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68. ibid., Table 7.8, p.. 80
69. "The public sector at present still disposes
directly of some 30 per cent of the financial
resources of the country, as against only 20 per
cent of a decade or so earlier", Economic Develop-
ment Programme, op ait., p. 71
70. Recall that the majority of the shortages were
located there - see Table 1.
*********************
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APPEJ DIX
On the difficulty of identifying productive and unproductive
Workers.
'Information' is a commodity input into many production
processes - it has use value, exchange value, it is bought,
sold and sometimes stolen. It is produced by workers under
conditions sometimes approaching those on the shop floor
and the labour process by which it is produced is often
subject to deskilling by mechanisation and fragmentation.
In South Africa in 1977, there were reported to be
27 990 workers in Occupation No. 217 'Office Machine Opera-
tor, Duplicating Machine, Punch Card Machine, Printing
Machine, Comptometer, Photostat, Computing, 'etc.1 This
occupation is in the category 'Clerical Workers1 - how
many of these workers are unproductive? According to
Mandel, all wage labour indispensable to the production
process is productive labour. Since production is impossi-
ble without "engineers, people working in laboratories,
overseers and even managers and stock clerks"2 they too
are productive workers.
What constitutes the realm of production of value and
surplus value and who are the productive and unproductive
workers? Using the breakdown in Table 1 and following
Mandel3, it is suggested that the following industries





4. Electricity, Gas and Water
5. Building and Construction
6. That part of Trade concerned with the selling
of meals in restaurants.
7. That part of Transport and Communication which is
involved in transporting commodities as opposed to
people, i.e. most of Sector Group 2 9 and part of
Sector Group 37 (SAR & H)
That part of Sector Group 38 (Postal Services)
which produces commodities, e.g. television films.
There were 1 191 508 workers in occupational categories
01 - 03 i.e. Professional, Semi-Professional and Technical;
Managerial, Administrative and Executive; and Clerical,
in South Africa in 1977. Ignoring those workers in the
three categories in the Public Services, i.e. 352 695
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workers, one is left with approximately 312 OOO workers
in those industries which produce value and surplus value
and 526 OOO1* in the realm of circulation.
Following the earlier line of reasoning, it will now
be argued that a substantial proportion of the 312 000
workers referred to above are 'productive' workers and
hence not active in the realm of circulation at all.5
NOTES
1. Manpower Survey No. 12, April 19?7% All Industries
and Occupations, Department of Labour, Pretoria,
p. 7 and Davies, op cit., p. 183.
2. Marx, Capital, Volume 2, Penguin and New Left Review,
London 1976. Introduction by Ernest Mandel, p. 46.
3. ibid, p. 44
4.. All of the category 01-03 workers in Sector Group 29,
and approximately half of those in Sector Groups 37
and 38 are assumed to be concerned with value and
surplus value production.
5. No assumptions about class are implied in this
argument.
